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JUST SAY NO: FORECLOSING A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
EMPLOYEES SEEKING REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 





 On January 11, 2010, New Jersey passed the New Jersey 
Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act (NJCUMMA or “Act”).1  
The Act passed with mostly positive support in both the House and 
the Senate,2 and Governor Jon Corzine signed it into law on January 
18, 2010,3 Governor Corzine’s last full day in office.4  The bill was one 
of fifty-five that Corzine signed on that day.5  This seemingly rushed 
procedure stands as a precursor to what a reading of the statute’s text 
reveals: a poorly written law that avoids answering many of the 
important issues in this complicated area of law.  The NJCUMMA 
leaves unanswered many key questions regarding medical marijuana 
in the employment law context, and, specifically, the accommodation 
of an employee’s off-site use of medical marijuana.  The problems 
and extensive litigation that arise when a medical marijuana statute is 
silent on this issue have begun to emerge in other states.6 
One of the major driving forces behind enacting medical 
marijuana statutes is the results of recent medical research suggesting 
 
* B.A. Cornell University, J.D. Seton Hall University School of Law. Special 
thanks to everyone that helped out along the way.  
1  Medical Marijuana: 18 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG 
(Feb. 8, 2012, 9:04 AM), http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php? 
resourceID=000881#NewJersey. 
 2  Id. The House voted to pass the Act 48–14, and the Senate passed the Act by a 
vote of 25–13.  Id. 
 3  Id.  
 4  Corzine signs medical marijuana bill on last day in office, N.Y. POST, Jan. 19, 2010, 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/corzine_signs_medical_marijuana_14Gz0yct
GPxX71ySAf83JL. 
 5  Corzine signs medical marijuana law, ABCLOCAL.GO.COM (Jan. 18, 2010), 
http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=news/local&id=7224843. 
 6  See infra Part IV.  
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the drug’s beneficial effects.7  As a reason for its enactment, the 
NJCUMMA specifically notes the potential use of marijuana to treat 
or alleviate pain and other symptoms associated with certain medical 
conditions.8  Yet, despite research showing the drug’s potential for 
medical use, marijuana remains a Schedule I controlled substance 
under the Controlled Substance Act.9  As a Schedule I drug, the 
federal government considers marijuana to be a drug with a high 
potential for abuse,10 no currently accepted medical use,11 and a lack 
of safety for using the drug under medical supervision.12  This means 
that under federal law, all possession or distribution of marijuana—
medical or not—is prohibited.13 
To date, eighteen states and the District of Columbia have 
enacted medical marijuana statutes.14  Medical marijuana statutes are 
also pending in other states.15  A common thread amongst all of these 
statutes is an emphasis on protection from state criminal 
prosecution.16  Some of these statutes explicitly protect employees 
against discrimination or retaliation based on medical marijuana 
use.17  The NJCUMMA has no such provision.  The Act neither 
 
 7  Stacy A. Hickox, Clearing the Smoke on Medical Marijuana Users in the Workplace, 
29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1001, 1002–03 (2011) (stating that “cannabinoids found in 
marijuana are known to relieve pain in patients who cannot otherwise find relief 
because of the adverse side effects from other analgesics”).  
 8  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-2 (West 2011) (“Modern medical research has 
discovered a beneficial use for marijuana in treating or alleviating the pain or other 
symptoms associated with certain debilitating medical conditions, as found by the 
National Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Medicine in March 1999.”). 
 9  21 U.S.C. § 812 (2006). 
 10  § 812(b)(1)(A). 
 11  § 812(b)(1)(B). 
 12  § 812(b)(1)(C). 
 13  § 844(a). 
 14  Medical Marijuana: 18 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, supra note 1.  
 15  Hickox, supra note 7, at 1003 (directing to summaries and links to bills).  
 16  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 17.37.030 (West 2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-
2811 (West 2011); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2011); COLO. CONST. 
art. XVIII, § 14 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2010 amendments); HAW. REV. STAT. § 
329-125 (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2423-E (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 333.26424 (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-301 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 453A.200 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-2 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 26-2B-4 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475.316 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
21-28.6-4 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4474b (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 69.51A.040 (West 2011). 
 17  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2813(B) (West 2011).  
Unless a failure to do so would cause an employer to lose a monetary 
or licensing related benefit under federal law or regulations, an 
employer may not discriminate against a person in hiring, termination 
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explicitly denies nor explicitly creates a private cause of action for 
employees to combat such discrimination. 
Like many other state medical marijuana statutes,18 the 
NJCUMMA explicitly states that an employer is not required to 
accommodate an employee’s use of marijuana “in any workplace.”19  
This type of limited language in a medical marijuana statute, which 
explicitly prohibits only on-site use or being under the influence of 
marijuana at work, may imply that accommodation is required for use 
outside of the workplace.20  A noted pitfall of medicinal marijuana 
statutes is their failure to address the accommodation of medical 
marijuana users who do not use marijuana at work or come to work 
under the influence of the drug.21  Many of these statutes fail to 
explicitly resolve this issue, and because “THC metabolites can be 
detected long after a user is impaired or influenced by the use of 
marijuana . . . medical marijuana users may still face discharge,” even 
if the user does not use marijuana in the workplace or come to work 
under the influence.22  Some argue that “[b]y negative inference, the 
failure to mention accommodation for employees who test positive 
on an employer-administered drug test, but who are not ‘under the 
influence’ at work, suggests that [such employees] could seek 
accommodations.”23  Following this line of reasoning, a medical 
marijuana user may request an accommodation “in the form of an 
exception to a zero-tolerance for positive drug tests.”24 
A closer examination of the NJCUMMA reveals that, while an 
 
or imposing any term or condition of employment or otherwise 
penalize a person based upon either: (1) The person’s status as a 
cardholder[; or] (2) A registered qualifying patient’s positive drug test 
for marijuana components or metabolites, unless the patient used, 
possessed or was impaired by marijuana on the premises of the place of 
employment or during the hours of employment. 
Id. 
 18  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 17.37.040(d)(1) (West 2011); COLO. CONST. art. 
XVIII, § 14(10)(b) (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2010 amendments); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 22. § 2426(2)(B) (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.26427(c)(2) 
(West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-205(2)(b) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
453A.800(2) (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 475.340(2) (West 2011); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 21-28.6-7(b)(2) (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.060(4) 
(West 2011).  
 19  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-14 (West 2011). 
 20  Hickox, supra note 7, at 1009. 
 21  Id.   
 22  Id.  
 23  Id. 
 24  Id.  
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employer would obviously be free to make such an accommodation, 
employers are under no obligation to acquiesce to such a request.  
Nevertheless, creative plaintiffs will likely bring failure-to-
accommodate suits due to the lack of absolute clarity in the 
NJCUMMA’s language.  As a result, the Legislature should amend the 
NJCUMMA to clarify this issue and foreclose the possibility that New 
Jersey employers will be subject to expensive and ultimately fruitless 
litigation.  The amendment to the Act should include explicit 
language clarifying that nothing in the Act should be construed to 
prevent an employer from maintaining a drug-free workplace. 
Part II of this Comment examines the plain language and 
legislative history of the NJCUMMA, as well as the current state of the 
Act’s implementation.  Part III provides an overview of New Jersey’s 
employment law regime and analyzes how the NJCUMMA fits into 
this framework.  Part IV discusses court decisions from other states 
involving employees’ off-site use of medical marijuana and predicts 
how these cases would be decided under New Jersey law.  In Part V, 
this Comment suggests how to amend and improve the NJCUMMA to 
avoid unnecessary litigation by adding language that preserves an 
employer’s right to maintain a drug-free workplace. 
II. THE NEW JERSEY COMPASSIONATE USE MEDICAL MARIJUANA ACT 
A. Plain Language of the New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical 
Marijuana Act 
Similar to other state medical marijuana statutes, the NJCUMMA 
fails to fully flesh out how employers should treat employees that use 
medical marijuana while not on the job.25  Once medical marijuana is 
distributed in New Jersey, litigation on this issue will be inevitable.  
To fully understand where the Act is lacking, we must first examine 
the plain language of the Act.  Courts interpreting medical marijuana 
statutes in other states have limited potential causes of action based 
on what is said and what is not said in the statute.26 
Initially, the NJCUMMA limits the class of people who could 
potentially have access to medical marijuana to only the seriously ill.27  
Specifically, marijuana is medically available via prescription to 
patients who will be able to use the marijuana to “alleviate suffering 
 
 25  See infra Part II.A.  
 26  See infra Part IV. 
 27  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-3 (West 2011). 
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from debilitating medical conditions.”28  NJCUMMA defines 
“debilitating medical condition” to include seizure disorders 
(including epilepsy), intractable skeletal muscular spasticity, or 
glaucoma.29  This definition also includes positive status for human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome (AIDS), or cancer.30  Other “debilitating medical 
conditions” include amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, multiple sclerosis, 
terminal cancer, muscular dystrophy, inflammatory bowel disease 
(including Crohn’s disease), terminal illness (if the physician has 
determined a prognosis of less than twelve months of life), and “any 
other medical condition or its treatment that is approved by the 
department by regulation.”31  The extreme nature of these 
“debilitating medical conditions” creates a more limited class of 
potential medical marijuana patients than in some other states.32  
These conditions are not, however, so extreme that any person with 
them would be confined to a hospital bed.  This means that, in New 
Jersey, medical marijuana users are likely to be employed individuals 
who will continue to work for their employer during their time as a 
medical marijuana patient.  Furthermore, the Act reserves the right 
to add additional medical conditions to this list through department 
regulations,33 meaning that the potential class of patients is open to 
expansion. 
The main stated purpose of the NJCUMMA is to “protect from 
arrest, prosecution, property forfeiture, and criminal and other 
penalties, those patients who use marijuana to alleviate suffering 
from debilitating medical conditions.”34  The NJCUMMA also 
provides protection from prosecution under state law for others 
 
 28  § 24:6I-2(e). 
 29  § 24:6I-3.  In addition, these conditions must be resistant to conventional 
medical therapy.  Id. 
 30  Id.  In addition, there is the added requirement for these conditions that 
severe or chronic pain, severe nausea or vomiting, cachexia, or wasting syndrome 
results from the condition or treatment thereof.  Id. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Cf. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2011).  
[S]eriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana 
for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate 
and has been recommended by a physician who has determined that 
the person’s health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the 
treatment of . . . any other illness for which marijuana provides relief. 
Id. 
 33  § 24:6I-3.   
 34  § 24:6I-2.  
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involved in the medical marijuana distribution system.35  This stated 
purpose seems to imply that the Act is intended solely to protect 
qualified patients from state criminal prosecution.36 
The Act also explicitly limits the availability of certain activities 
and protections to medical marijuana patients.37  Conduct explicitly 
not permitted under the NJCUMMA includes operating any vehicle, 
aircraft, train, boat, or heavy machinery while under the influence of 
marijuana.38  The Act also exempts from protection smoking 
marijuana on a school bus, on public transportation, in a currently 
operating private vehicle, on any school ground, in any “correctional 
facility, at any public park or beach, at any recreation center, or in 
any place where smoking is prohibited pursuant to [New Jersey’s 
public smoking statute].”39 
Limiting the Act’s application in the employment context, the 
Act states “[n]othing in this act shall be construed to require . . . an employer 
to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any workplace.”40  This 
provision seemingly makes a request for accommodation an open 
and shut case: the NJCUMMA does not require an employer to 
accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any workplace.  There 
are, however, three potential interpretations of the phrase “use of 
marijuana in any workplace.”  First, it could mean that the only action 
an employer need not accommodate is the actual smoking or 
ingestion of medical marijuana while in the workplace.  Second, this 
phrase could mean that an employer need not accommodate an 
employee who comes to work under the influence of medical 
marijuana.  A third interpretation is that an employer need not 
accommodate the presence of THC metabolites in the system of a 
medical marijuana patient-employee.  This third possible 
interpretation of the phrase “use in any workplace” would mean that 
an employer is not required to accommodate a request from an 
employee that he or she be given a “pass” on a drug test that would 
 
 35  § 24:6I-6 (“No person shall be subject to arrest or prosecution for constructive 
possession, conspiracy or any other offense for simply being in the presence or 
vicinity of the medical use of marijuana as authorized under this act.”). 
 36  But see Melissa Brown, Comment, The Garden State Just Got Greener: New Jersey is 
the Fourteenth State in the Nation to Legalize Medical Marijuana, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1519, 1551 (2011) (arguing that the NJCUMMA only provides an affirmative defense 
to medical marijuana patients, not protection from arrest and prosecution). 
 37  § 24:6I-8. 
 38  § 24:6I-8(a). 
 39  § 24:6I-8(b). 
 40  § 24:6I-14 (emphasis added).  
STARK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  3:41 PM 
2013] COMMENT 415 
 
reveal (still federally illegal) marijuana use. 
The language of the Act is ambiguous enough that it will not 
deter an ambitious plaintiff from bringing (and possibly succeeding) 
on a failure-to-accommodate claim.  A problem arises from the fact 
that “use in any workplace” is quite different than home-use of 
medical marijuana during non-working hours.  This language is 
bound to cause confusion.  The Act mentions nothing about 
employer accommodation of an employee’s off-site use of medical 
marijuana, despite the obvious fact that most medical marijuana users 
administer the drug in the privacy of their homes. 
How long marijuana stays in a person’s system depends on how 
often marijuana is used.41  This means that an employee could test 
positive for marijuana in an employer-administered drug test even 
though he or she did not “use” medical marijuana in the workplace.  
Arguably, a requested accommodation (e.g., allowing a positive drug 
test result or requesting an alternate form of a drug test that would 
test for something other than “leftover” remnants of medical 
marijuana) must be granted under the current language of the 
NJCUMMA.42  The Legislature should amend this portion of the 
statute to clarify this issue and to prevent costly litigation, which is 
likely to arise as a result of this ambiguity.  The best solution is to 
amend the Act to include the following language: “Nothing in this act 
should be construed to require . . . an employer to accommodate the 
medical use of marijuana or change existing drug policies.”  
Employers should not be forced to accommodate employee use of a 
drug that remains illegal under federal law.  Compassionate 
employers may still voluntarily make an accommodation for a 
medical marijuana patient, but forcing employers to allow employees 
to use drugs that are illegal under federal law is bad policy.  While at 
some point it may be necessary to reevaluate this policy if marijuana 
is decriminalized at the federal level, we have not yet reached that 
point and, as a result, any legally required accommodation for 
medical marijuana use is unwarranted. 
Even if the “use in any workplace” language is interpreted to 
mean that an employer need not make any accommodation 
 
 41  Mental Heath—Marijuana and Its Effects, WEBMD, 
http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/marijuana-use-and-its-effects (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2012) (“Light users—those who smoke pot once in a while—will have a 
negative drug screen after a marijuana-free week.  Heavy users . . . may continue 
testing positive for a month after last smoking pot.”). 
 42  See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
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whatsoever for a medical marijuana patient-employee,43 this 
interpretation is complicated by other language in the Act. The 
NJCUMMA states: 
A qualifying patient . . . or any other person acting in 
accordance with the provisions of this act shall not be subject 
to any civil or administrative penalty, or denied any right or 
privilege, including, but not limited to, civil penalty or 
disciplinary action by a professional licensing board, related 
to the medical use of marijuana as authorized under this act.44 
Nearly identical language also appears in the Assembly Committee 
Statement45 and Senate Committee Statement46 regarding the 
NJCUMMA.  This language seems to suggest the Act offers a certain 
protection of rights for medical marijuana patient-employees.  
Specifically, a plaintiff may argue that any adverse employment action 
taken against him or her on the basis of medical marijuana use 
qualifies as a denial of a right or privilege under the New Jersey Law 
Against Discrimination (NJLAD).47  This argument is likely to fail,48 
but to avoid confusion and unnecessary litigation, the Legislature 
must amend the Act’s language.  It would be wise to include language 
stating: “Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent an 
employer from taking adverse employment action against an 
employee as a result of a positive result in a drug test for THC 
metabolites.” 
B. Legislative Findings and Declarations 
The text of the NJCUMMA outlines the legislative findings and 
declarations behind the Act.49  The Act notes that modern medical 
research has discovered beneficial uses for marijuana “in treating or 
alleviating the pain or other symptoms associated with certain 
debilitating medical conditions.”50  It also notes that fourteen other 
states have enacted laws permitting the use of medical marijuana,51 
and that New Jersey wishes to join this effort “for the health and 
 
 43  See infra Part IV for a discussion of the application of this interpretation in 
other states. 
 44  § 24:6I-6 (emphasis added). 
 45  GEN. ASSEMB. 213-804, at 4 (N.J. 2009). 
 46  S. 213-119, at 4 (N.J. 2009).  
 47  See infra Part III for further analysis of this argument. 
 48  See infra Part III. 
 49  § 24:6I-2. 
 50  § 24:6I-2(a). 
 51  § 24:6I-2(c). 
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welfare of its citizens.”52  The Act notes that states are not required to 
enforce federal law, and, as such, “compliance with this act does not 
put the State of New Jersey in violation of federal law.”53 
The Act emphasizes that because “[c]ompassion dictates that a 
distinction be made between medical and non-medical uses of 
marijuana,” one of the main purposes of the Act is to “protect from 
arrest, prosecution, property forfeiture, and criminal and other 
penalties, those patients who use marijuana to alleviate suffering 
from debilitating medical conditions.”54  Language found elsewhere 
in the Act, stating that nothing in the Act “is to be construed to 
require . . . an employer to accommodate the medical use of 
marijuana in any workplace,”55 echoes the Senate Assembly Health 
and Senior Services Committee Statement. 
The main focus of these declarations seems to be emphasizing 
the Act’s main goal of removing criminal liability under state law for 
patients involved in New Jersey’s medical marijuana program.  But, 
due to similar legislation in other states at the time of NJCUMMA’s 
adoption, the New Jersey Legislature must have known that confusion 
would arise over the issue of employer accommodation of employee 
medical marijuana use.56  Yet it chose to avoid answering these hard 
questions and remained silent.  Because the NJCUMMA’s scope is 
limited as compared to the more liberal medical marijuana statutes in 
other states,57 a liberal interpretation of the Act would be out of line.  
The Act’s main focus is to provide protection from state criminal 
conviction, not to create a new right for employees.  The Act should 
have stated this distinction clearly in the “Findings and Declarations” 
section.  In sum, the discovery of medical benefits of marijuana and 
the Act’s claim of compassionate goals are not enough to create a 
new set of accommodation obligations for employers in New Jersey. 
 
 52  Id. 
 53  § 24:6I-2(d). 
 54  § 24:6I-2(e). 
 55  § 24:6I-1.  
 56  See, e.g., DiProspero v. Penn, 874 A.2d 1039, 1049 (N.J. 2005) (citing another 
source) (“‘[T]he Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial construction of its 
enactments.’”). 
 57  See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2011) (discussed infra 
Part IV). 
STARK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  3:41 PM 
418 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:409 
 
C. The Current State of the NJCUMMA58 
The NJCUMMA is in its fledgling stage.  Although the statute is 
in effect, as of the time of this Comment’s publication, medical 
marijuana has not been distributed in New Jersey.59  The NJCUMMA 
was intended to become effective six months after it was enacted.60  
Despite this intention, the New Jersey Department of Health and 
Senior Services (DHSS), the State Legislature, and New Jersey 
Governor Chris Christie have struggled to reach a consensus on the 
details of running the program.61  The DHSS website FAQs section 
once indicated that medical marijuana patient registration would 
begin in the latter part of 2011.62  After some delay, and as of August 
8, 2012, the patient registry is open.63 
On July 19, 2011, Governor Christie announced his 
authorization for the state to begin dispensing medical marijuana to 
patients who qualify, despite his concern over whether federal 
authorities could prosecute state employees or state-approved 
growers.64  Governor Christie explained that the delay was caused in 
part by his desire to roll out the program in a way that would 
“withstand legal scrutiny” and simultaneously help those in need of 
medical marijuana.65  Governor Christie also expressed a desire to 
avoid “the type of real societal problems that you see . . . [in] 
Colorado or California.”66  Governor Christie expressed a belief that 
the medical marijuana programs in these states “are significantly out 
of control and leading to other problems in society that they were 
never intended to cause or contribute to.”67  Governor Christie 
 
 58  This section is current as of September 2012.  For up to date information on 
the NJCUMMA, visit the New Jersey Department of Health’s Medical Marijuana 
Program website at http://www.state.nj.us/health/medicalmarijuana/.  
 59  Medical Marijuana: 18 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, supra note 1. 
 60  Id. 
 61  Id.  
 62  Id. 
 63  Medicinal Marijuana Program: Frequently Asked Questions, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (July 19, 2011), 
http://www.state.nj.us/health/medicalmarijuana/faqs.shtml.  
 64  N.J. Medical Marijuana Gets Green Light by Gov. Christie, N.J. NEWS ROOM (July 19, 
2011), http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/healthquest/nj-medical-marijuana-gets-
green-light-by-gov-christie. 
 65  Chris Christie, Governor of New Jersey, Comments on the Resumption of New 
Jersey’s Medical Marijuana Program (July 19, 2011), transcript available at 
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/state/gov-chris-christies-comments-of-the-
resumption-of-new-jerseys-medical-marijuana-program. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id.  It is likely that Governor Christie used the phrases “out of control” and 
STARK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  3:41 PM 
2013] COMMENT 419 
 
expressed a desire to limit the exposure of all parties involved to any 
risk of federal prosecution.68  New Jersey towns have also been 
dragging their feet in approving permits for medical marijuana 
centers.69 
Despite these delays, the slow progress of implementing the Act 
is unlikely to stop the Act from coming to fruition.  Eventually, 
medical marijuana will be distributed in New Jersey and litigation will 
arise out of adverse employment actions taken against medical 
marijuana patients.  It is best to amend the Act for clarification on 
this topic and to preserve an employer’s right to maintain a drug-free 
workplace before this type of litigation begins.  While uncertainty in 
the employment context is not the sole problem with the 
NJCUMMA,70 it is among the major problems with the Act that calls 
for resolution through decisive legislative action rather than through 
unnecessary litigation.  The New Jersey state government and local 
townships’ hesitation and resistance could be reduced if issues such 
as these are resolved by amending the Act before its full-blown 
implementation.  The resulting reduction in uncertainty would 
benefit all parties involved. 
D. Rules & Regulations 
Rules promulgated under the NJCUMMA may be helpful in the 
Act’s interpretation. Unfortunately, as of the time of this Comment’s 
publication, the limited promulgated rules do not clarify the issue of 
medical marijuana in the employment law context.71  The DHSS 
released draft rules outlining the registration and application process 
on October 6, 2010.72  The DHSS held a public hearing to discuss the 
proposed rules on December 6, 2010.73  In response, on December 
20, 2010, Senator Nicholas Scutari, lead sponsor of the medical 
 
“other problems in society” in reference to the ease of obtaining marijuana in these 
states and the clashes that have occurred with federal authorities.  See, e.g., Teens’ Ease 
Of Getting Marijuana Blamed On Medical Pot Cards, 10NEWS.COM (Mar. 30, 2011), 
http://www.10news.com/news/27378646/detail.html; Debbi Baker, Medical 
marijuana shop raided in Kearny Mesa, UTSANDIEGO.COM (Jan. 10, 2012), 
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2012/jan/18/clairemont-marijuana-shop-raidec.  
 68  Id. 
 69  Amy Brittain, 2 Years after Being Approved, N.J. Medical Marijuana Program Still at 
Seedling Stage, NJ.COM (Jan. 16, 2012), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/01/ 
2_years_after_being_approved_n.html. 
 70  See Brown, supra note 36, for a discussion of other pitfalls of the Act. 
 71  See N.J ADMIN. CODE § 8:64 et seq.  
 72  Medical Marijuana: 18 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, supra note 1. 
 73  Id.  
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marijuana bill, submitted Senate Concurrent Resolution (SCR) 140 
declaring that the “Board of Medical Examiners proposed medicinal 
marijuana program rules are inconsistent with legislative intent.”74  
Additionally, the New Jersey Senate Health, Human Services and 
Senior Citizens Committee held a public hearing to discuss SCR 140 
and a similar bill, SCR 130, on January 20, 2011.75 
In response to the negative feedback on the draft version of the 
rules, the DHSS proposed new rules76 that clarified the permit 
process for growing and dispensing marijuana, barred home delivery 
by alternative treatment centers, and mandated that “conditions 
originally named in the Act be resistant to conventional medical 
therapy in order to qualify as debilitating medical conditions.”77  The 
new rules were adopted and became effective as of December 19, 
2011.78  Notably, the rules require the six Alternate Treatment 
Centers—the six state-sanctioned sources of medical marijuana—to 
“establish, implement and adhere to a written alcohol, drug-free and 
smoke-free workplace policy.”79  Such policies would be required to 
address “[t]he policy’s inapplicability if an employee, who is also a 
qualifying patient, fails the drug test solely because of the presence of 
marijuana in a confirmed positive test result.”80  The section of the 
rules addressing exemption from state criminal and civil penalties for 
the medical use of marijuana does not clarify this issue.81 
III. THE EXISTING CANON OF NEW JERSEY EMPLOYMENT LAW 
The potential impact of the NJCUMMA cannot be fully 
understood without an examination of New Jersey’s laws regarding 
drug testing and protection from discrimination in the employment 
context.  With some limited restrictions, private employers are 
permitted to use drug testing in New Jersey.82  This means it is very 
likely that some employer will eventually encounter a situation in 
which an employee or potential employee tests positive for THC as a 
result of his or her medical marijuana use.  When this occurs, the 
employer may choose to fire or refuse to hire that employee.  If that 
 
 74  Id.  
 75  Id.  
 76  Id.  
 77  Id.  
 78  See N.J ADMIN. CODE § 8:64 et seq. 
 79  Id. at § 8.64-9.6(a). 
 80  Id. at § 8:64-9.6(c)(1).  
 81  See id. at § 8:64-13.11.  
 82  See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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employee chooses to sue over this adverse employment action, he or 
she is likely to bring claims for failure to make a reasonable 
accommodation and for termination in violation of public policy.83  
The limited definition of conditions that qualify a patient for medical 
marijuana under the NJCUMMA84 means that it is likely that this 
plaintiff-employee would fall under New Jersey’s expansive definition 
of “disabled,”85 and such a qualification is a pre-requisite to a 
reasonable accommodation claim.86  The NJCUMMA is also likely to 
stand as a clear source of public policy, opening the door for 
plaintiffs to bring a “discharge in violation of public policy” claim.87  
Despite these apparent pitfalls, a closer assessment of New Jersey’s 
employment law suggests that an employer is still likely to successfully 
defend against these types of claims.88  This conclusion rests largely 
on the limited scope of the NJCUMMA.89 
A. Drug Testing under New Jersey Law 
New Jersey does not have statutory regulation of private-sector 
drug testing.90  The New Jersey Supreme Court has placed some limits 
on drug testing in the employment context.91  In Hennessey v. Coastal 
Eagle Point Oil Co., 92 the court implied “that common law privacy 
rights forbid ‘random’ drug testing in the private sector except for 
employees in ‘safety-sensitive’ positions.”93  Employees in non-safety-
sensitive positions “may be tested only ‘for cause,’ and all testing 
programs must conform to certain procedural ‘due process’ 
guidelines . . . .”94  Pre-employment applicant drug testing is neither 
prohibited under New Jersey law, nor restricted by the decision in 
Hennessey.95 
 
 83  This is what plaintiffs did in other states.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 84  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-3 (West 2011). 
 85  See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 86  See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 87  See discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
 88  See discussion infra Parts III.B.1–3. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Drug/Alcohol Testing of Employees in New Jersey, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP (2011), 
available at http://www.foxrothschild.com/uploadedFiles/newspublications/ 
PA_LE_DrugAlcoholTesting_NewJersey.pdf.  
 91  See, e.g., Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11 (N.J. 1992). 
 92  Id. 
 93  Drug/Alcohol Testing of Employees in New Jersey, supra note 90.  
 94  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 95  See Vargo v. Nat’l Exch. Carriers Ass’n, Inc., 870 A.2d 679, 686 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2005) (Noting a finding of no invasion of privacy expectations due to a 
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These limited restrictions allow for the creation of numerous 
opportunities for medical marijuana patients to test positive for 
marijuana and either be denied employment (at the pre-employment 
application phase) or terminated (for those in safety-sensitive 
positions or those tested for cause in accordance with procedural 
guidelines).  For example, a medical marijuana patient in New Jersey 
could be denied employment due to a routine pre-employment drug 
screening that revealed the presence of THC in his or her system.96  
This type of drug test would be legal under New Jersey law, and it is 
likely that the employer would refuse to hire that person as a result of 
evidence indicating that he or she uses a federally illegal drug.  
Clearly, “[f]rom an employer’s perspective, an employee’s use of 
illegal drugs presents multiple problems.”97  The use of drugs that are 
illegal under federal law “can affect an employee’s performance . . . , 
endanger co-workers, and increase health-care costs.”98  Still, the 
potential employee is likely to feel that he or she is being 
discriminated against because of his or her status as a medical 
marijuana user.  As a result, the potential employee is likely to bring a 
suit against the employer for its refusal to hire.99  This obvious conflict 
between company drug policies and what is permitted under the 
NJCUMMA is yet another reason why the Legislature should amend 
the Act to allow companies to keep their existing drug testing policies 
in place. 
B. The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 
Medical marijuana users who believe they were discriminated 
against are likely to rely on New Jersey’s employee protection statute, 
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD), to support their 
claim.  Creative plaintiffs may argue that they were discriminated 
against because of the underlying disability that led to their medical 
marijuana use.  Plaintiffs may also argue that a potential employer is 
refusing to make a reasonable accommodation for their underlying 
handicap that led to their medical marijuana use.  The text of the 
 
waiver on the part of the prospective employee where employer had “a long-standing 
drug-free workplace policy and pre-employment drug screening policy for all 
applicants for permanent positions,” and the potential employee knew of the policy 
when he signed the “Terms and Conditions of Employment” and “voluntarily 
submitted to the non-intrusive drug test in a private bathroom.”). 
 96  This was a subject of litigation in California. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 97  Hennessey, 609 A.2d at 27 (Pollock, J., concurring). 
 98  Id. 
 99  This was a subject of litigation in California. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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NJCUMMA, however, does not support these arguments, and 
exposing employers to these types of liabilities and obligations has no 
foundation in the purpose underlying the Act.100  The NJCUMMA 
should be amended to include language that limits the obligations of 
employers and eliminates the confusion resulting from the conflict 
between what is protected by the NJLAD and what is permitted under 
the NJCUMMA. 
1. Disability under the NJLAD 
To constitute a protected class—the first element of a prima 
facie case for disability discrimination—a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that he or she qualifies as an individual with a disability, or is 
perceived as having a disability, as defined under the statute.101  This 
burden is “rather modest.”102  As a result, it is likely that a plaintiff 
would fall within a protected class because of his or her underlying 
disability that requires the use of medical marijuana.  This chance is 
compounded by the fact that the definition of “disability” in the 
NJLAD has some overlap with the definition of “debilitating medical 
condition” in the NJCUMMA.103 
Under the NJLAD’s federal counterpart, the Americans With 
Disabilities Act (ADA), a person “currently engaging in the illegal use 
of drugs” is not a “qualified individual with a disability,”104 and 
marijuana is still an “illegal drug” for the purposes of federal law.105  
The NJLAD, however, is dissimilar.106  Disability under the NJLAD is 
expansively defined.107  Under the NJLAD, the definition of 
 
 100  See discussion infra Part II.A, II.B. 
 101  Victor v. State, 4 A.3d 126, 140 (N.J. 2010). 
 102  Id. 
 103  Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West 2011), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-3 
(West 2011).  
 104  42 U.S.C.A. § 12114(a) (West 2006) (Under the ADA, “a qualified individual 
with a disability shall not include any employee or applicant who is currently 
engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such 
use”). 
 105  See 21 U.S.C.A. § 812 (listing “Marihuana” as a Schedule I drug, defined as a 
substance with “a high potential for abuse . . . no currently accepted medical use in 
treatment in the United States . . . [and] a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug 
or other substance under medical supervision.”). 
 106  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West 2011). 
 107  Id.  
[P]hysical disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement which is 
caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness including epilepsy and 
other seizure disorders, and which shall include, but not be limited to, 
any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of physical coordination, 
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“disability” does not explicitly carve out illegal drug use.108  
Accordingly, users of illegal drugs—such as marijuana—are not 
automatically barred from a claim of disability if they are subject to an 
adverse employment action resulting from such use. 
More importantly, many of the conditions that qualify as a 
“disability” under the NJLAD overlap with the definition of 
“debilitating medical condition” under the NJCUMMA.109  For 
example, like the NJCUMMA, the NJLAD also lists epilepsy, other 
seizure disorders, AIDS, and HIV as qualifying disorders.110  This 
means that, in New Jersey, a medical marijuana patient’s ailment is 
likely to fall under the definition of “disability” for purposes of the 
NJLAD.  A positive result for the presence of THC in a drug test 
would be directly linked to the patient’s disability because a patient 
uses medical marijuana for the purpose of alleviating his or her 
disability.  It is likely, then, that a plaintiff will be able to argue that an 
adverse employment action in response to a positive drug test on 
account of his or her use of medical marijuana was an adverse 
employment action taken as a result of the disability itself. 
Further supporting this notion is the fact that the NJLAD has 
“broad remedial purposes and the wide scope of its coverage for 
disabilities as compared to the ADA support an expansive view of 
protecting rights of persons with disabilities in the workplace.”111  
Courts should construe the NJLAD “to prohibit any unlawful 
discrimination against any person because such person is or has been 
at any time disabled [as well as] any unlawful employment practice 
against such person, unless the nature and extent of the disability 
reasonably precludes the performance of the particular 
 
blindness or visual impediment, deafness or hearing impediment, 
muteness or speech impediment or physical reliance on a service or 
guide dog, wheelchair, or other remedial appliance or device, or any 
mental, psychological or developmental disability, including autism 
spectrum disorders, resulting from anatomical, psychological, 
physiological or neurological conditions which prevents the normal 
exercise of any bodily or mental functions or is demonstrable, 
medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory 
diagnostic techniques. Disability shall also mean AIDS or HIV 
infection. 
Id. 
 108  See id. 
 109  Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(q) (West 2011), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-3 
(West 2011).  
 110  Id. 
 111  Victor v. State, 4 A.3d 126, 143 (N.J. 2010). 
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employment.”112  The expansive reading and remedial purpose of the 
NJLAD may supply plaintiffs with the argument that when an 
employer takes an adverse employment action against them as a 
result of their medical marijuana use, they were discriminated against 
because of their disability. 
2. Reasonable Accommodation under the NJLAD 
A medical marijuana user may request that an employer 
accommodate his or her underlying disability in the form of a “free 
pass” on a drug test.113  Judicial interpretations of the NJLAD will help 
provide guidance for analyzing a reasonable accommodation claim 
arising from a medical marijuana user. The NJLAD does not 
specifically address reasonable accommodation, but New Jersey 
courts “have uniformly held that the law nevertheless requires an 
employer to reasonably accommodate an employee’s handicap.”114 
To prevail on a failure to accommodate claim under the NJLAD, 
a plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1) the employer knew about the 
employee’s disability; (2) the employee requested accommodations 
or assistance for her disability; (3) the employer did not make a good 
faith effort to assist; and (4) the employee could have been 
reasonably accommodated.”115  Unlike the ADA, the NJLAD “[is] 
intended to cover more than just severe disabilities, and, accordingly, 
does not require that the handicap substantially limit a major life 
activity.”116  New Jersey case law takes a very broad view of handicap, 
expanding the definition to a point where almost anything can 
preclude a grant of summary judgment for the employer.117  Legal 
precedent states that the NJLAD defines “handicap” more broadly 
than the ADA’s comparable definition of “disability.”118  The NJLAD’s 
statutory definition of “handicapped” is “very broad in  its scope,”119 
 
 112  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4.1 (West 2011).  
 113  Medical marijuana users have made similar accommodation requests in other 
states.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
 114  Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Super. Ct., 798 A.2d 648, 654 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2002). 
 115  Peacock v. Albertsons Acme Mkts., 607 F. Supp. 2d 694, 700 (D.N.J. 2009). 
 116  Santiago v. City of Vineland, 107 F. Supp. 2d 512, 547 (D.N.J. 2000) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 117  See, e.g., Nieves v. Individualized Shirts, 961 F. Supp. 782, 795 (D.N.J. 1997) 
(issues of material fact existed as to whether employee’s varicose veins were a 
handicap under NJLAD, precluding summary judgment). 
 118  Tynan, 798 A.2d at 655. 
 119  Clowes v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 538 A.2d 794, 803–04 (N.J. 1988) (holding that 
alcoholism falls within the NJLAD’s definition of “handicapped”). 
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and has been held to encompass ailments such as back ailment,120 
heart attack,121 alcoholism,122 obesity,123 and drug addiction.124  
Regarding the applicability of the NJLAD to “handicapped” persons, 
the statute states that “[a]ll persons shall have the opportunity to 
obtain employment . . . without discrimination because of . . . 
disability . . . subject only to conditions and limitations applicable 
alike to all persons.”125  Under the NJLAD, unless it is shown that “a 
person’s disability would prevent such person from performing a 
particular job,” 126 it is unlawful to take an adverse employment action 
“solely because such person is a person with a disability.”127  In sum, 
termination of an employee for a covered condition that does not 
prevent the employee from doing his or her job is actionable under 
the NJLAD.128 
With regard to making a reasonable accommodation for a 
person with a disability or handicap, employers are required to 
conduct their employment procedures in such a manner as 
to [ensure] that all people with disabilities are given equal 
consideration [as] people who do not have disabilities for 
all aspects of employment including, but not limited to, 
hiring, promotion, tenure, training, assignment, transfers, 
and leaves on the basis of their qualifications and abilities.129 
An employee or potential employee’s ability to perform a particular 
job “must be assessed on an individual basis.”130  Suggested reasonable 
accommodations include, but are not limited to, job restructuring 
and acquisition or modification of equipment or devices.131 
An employer must make a reasonable accommodation “unless 
the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
 
 120  Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 446 A.2d 483, 494 (N.J. 1982). 
 121  Panettieri v. C.V. Hill Refrigeration, 388 A.2d 630, 639 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1978). 
 122  Clowes, 538 A.2d at 804. 
 123  Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 594 A.2d 264, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1991).  
 124  In re Cahill, 585 A.2d 977, 979 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
 125  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2011) (the statute goes as far as to say that 
“[t]his opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right”). 
 126  § 10:5-29.1. 
 127  Id. 
 128  See, e.g., Svarnas v. AT&T Commc’ns, 740 A.2d 662, 670 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1999). 
 129  N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:13-2.5 (2011).  
 130  Id.  
 131  Id. 
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impose an undue hardship on the operation of its business.”132  This 
determination is made on a case-by-case basis.133  An employer is 
required to “consider the possibility of reasonable accommodation”134 
before taking an adverse employment action against an employee or 
potential employee.135  When determining whether the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer’s 
business, courts will consider the nature of the accommodation 
needed and “the extent to which accommodation would involve 
waiver of an essential requirement of a job as opposed to a tangential 
or non-business necessity requirement.”136  A recent regulation 
change adds the language: “In determining whether an 
accommodation would impose undue hardship on the operation of 
an employer’s business, factors to be considered include . . . [t]he 
nature and cost of the accommodation needed, taking into 
consideration the availability of tax credits and deductions and/or outside 
funding.”137  As a practical concern, an employer may worry about loss 
of federal funding if employees are using medical marijuana (which 
is still illegal under federal law).138  If this proposed language is 
adopted, employers will be allowed to refuse accommodation of 
medical marijuana use if they could stand to lose federal funding or 
tax benefits by employing medical marijuana users. 
There is a chance that an employer would be required to take 
preemptive accommodation action for a medical marijuana user.139  
Regarding the need for an employee’s request for a reasonable 
accommodation: 
An employer must participate in an interactive process 
when an employee makes a request for an accommodation. 
An employer also may have to engage in the interactive 
process even when the employee has not requested a 
reasonable accommodation. In addition, an employer must 
consider making a reasonable accommodation before 
firing, demoting, or refusing to hire or promote a person 
 
 132  Id. 
 133  Id. 
 134  Id. 
 135  § 13:13-2.5(b)(2). 
 136  Id. 
 137  § 13:13-2.5(b)(3)(iii) (emphasis added).  
 138  See Susan K. Livio, Rutgers Declines Growing Medical Marijuana to Not Risk Federal 
Funding (NJ.COM), July 24, 2010, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/07/ 
rutgers_declines_growing_medic.html. 
 139  See § 13:13-2.5(b)(2). 
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with a disability because the disability precludes job 
performance, regardless of whether the employee 
requested an accommodation.140 
An employer can reject an employee if his or her handicap 
makes him or her unable to perform the job.141  “For example, if an 
applicant has a disability that prevents him from working certain 
hours of the day, the employer must consider whether the applicant 
can be accommodated by changing the hours or job duties.”142  A 
possible argument is that if an employee is in a safety-sensitive 
position, an employee that uses medical marijuana for medical 
purposes or otherwise would be unqualified for the position.  As a 
result, the employer would be able to deny or terminate employment 
of medical marijuana employee-patients for these types of positions.  
For employees working in non-safety-sensitive positions, the result 
may not be as clear.  How could it be said that the presence of THC 
metabolites in a medical-marijuana patient makes them unable to 
perform a job that entails, for example, jockeying spreadsheets in a 
cubicle? 
3. Discharge Contrary to Public Policy 
In Pierce v. Ortho Pharm Corp.,143 the New Jersey Supreme Court 
created a cause of action for wrongful discharge for any employee 
discharged “contrary to a clear mandate of public policy.”144  The 
source of public policy for purposes of a Pierce claim is expansive in 
New Jersey and can include “legislation; administrative rules, 
regulations or decisions; and judicial decisions.”145  If an employee 
fails to identify a “specific expression of public policy,” he or she “may 
be discharged with or without cause.”146  An alleged source of public 
policy will “not constitute a clear mandate” if it is “vague, 
 
 140  Michael D. Homans, Anti-discrimination Laws: New Jersey, THE PRACTICAL LAW 
COMPANY (2011), at 4 http://www.flastergreenberg.com/media/site_files/ 
344_Anti_discrimination_Laws_New_Jersey.pdf (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:13-
2.5(b)(2) (2011)). 
 141  Harris v. Middlesex Cnty. Coll., 801 A.2d 397, 405 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2002) (“The [NJLAD] allows an employer freedom to reject those applicants who are 
unable to do the job, whether because they are generally unqualified or because they 
have a handicap that in fact impedes job performance.  There should be no second-
guessing the employer.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
 142  Homans, supra note 140, at 4. 
 143  Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d. 505 (N.J. 1980).  
 144  Id. at 512. 
 145  Id.  
 146  Id. 
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controversial, unsettled, and otherwise problematic.”147  Although the 
NJCUMMA constitutes adopted legislation and a clear mandate of 
public policy, the policy that it establishes has nothing to do with 
protecting medical-marijuana patients from adverse employment 
action.148  The Act merely establishes a protection from state criminal 
prosecution for medical marijuana patients in New Jersey.  The Act 
says nothing about protecting the employment rights of these 
patients.149  Therefore, an employer who fires or chooses not to hire a 
medical marijuana patient due to the results of a routine drug 
screening is not denying the patient any right the NJCUMMA creates.  
In this context, the employer is merely exercising its option not to 
employ that person.  Without an amendment extending this 
protection to potential patients, a Pierce claim related to a discharge 
for a positive drug test stemming from medical marijuana use should 
fail. 
Regarding the interaction of Pierce public policy claims and 
employee drug testing, the court in Hennessy indicated that the 
discharge of an employee for “failing (or refusing to take) a random 
test for illegal drug use implicates a clear mandate of public policy 
protecting individual privacy rights,” but ultimately held that the 
“discharge was lawful where [the] employee served in a safety-
sensitive position.”150  The Hennessy court engaged in a balancing 
analysis, weighing the employee’s individual privacy against the 
public’s interest in safety.151  The court found that the “public’s 
interest in ensuring that workers in safety-sensitive positions are drug-
free outweighs any individual right to privacy,” and that “safety 
outweighs a right to privacy in off-duty activities.”152  Hennessy, 
however, dealt with a random drug screening153 and not mandatory 
pre-employment drug screenings for all employees, and, as such, may 
be limited to its facts.  The court did note, however, that issues 
regarding drug testing in the workplace are better addressed through 
“legislative action or labor-relations agreements” than extensive 
litigation.154  This provides further support for the proposition that 
 
 147  MacDougall v. Weichert, 677 A.2d 162, 167 (N.J. 1996). 
 148  See discussion supra Parts II.A–B. 
 149  See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 150  MacDougall, 677 A.2d at 168 (discussing Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil 
Co., 609 A.2d 11 (N.J. 1992)).  
 151  Hennessey, 609 A.2d at 20. 
 152  Id. at 21.  
 153  See id. 
 154  Id. at 23. 
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the Legislature should amend the NJCUMMA to clarify that 
employers are still free to maintain a drug-free work environment 
and continue to implement drug-screening policies that may produce 
adverse employment consequences for medical marijuana patients. 
IV. LITIGATION IN OTHER STATES ON THIS ISSUE 
Looking at litigation in other states can help predict how 
litigation on this issue will unfold in New Jersey courts.  To date, 
there have been four major cases involving medical marijuana in the 
employment context.155  The court in each of these cases refused to 
extend protection to plaintiffs who suffered adverse employment 
action as a result of medical marijuana use.  In line with these other 
cases, and given the limited text and purpose of the NJCUMMA, a 
New Jersey court is likely to, and correctly should, arrive at the 
conclusion that the NJCUMMA does not create a new cause of action 
for employees to use against their employers. 
A. California (Ross v. Ragingwire Telecommunications, Inc.) 
In Ross v. Ragingwire Telecommunications, Inc., the California 
Supreme Court dealt with a claim from a plaintiff who was fired for 
failing a pre-employment drug test.156  On the advice of his physician, 
the plaintiff was using medical marijuana to treat chronic pain.157  
The plaintiff brought claims alleging that he was discharged because 
of his disability, that his employer failed to make a reasonable 
accommodation for his disability, and that his employer discharged 
him in violation of public policy.158  The plaintiff was a qualified 
individual with a disability under California law, and was receiving 
governmental disability benefits.159 
The court concluded that neither the text nor the history of 
California’s medical-marijuana act suggested an intention to “address 
the respective rights and duties of employers and employees.”160  
 
 155  Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 914 (W.D. Mich. 2011); Ross v. 
RagingWire Telecomms., Inc., 174 P.3d 200 (Cal. 2008); Emerald Steel Fabricators, 
Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518 (Or. 2010); Roe v. TeleTech 
Customer Care Mgmt., 257 P.3d 586 (Wash. 2011). 
 156  Ross, 174 P.3d at 202. 
 157  Id.  
 158  Id. at 203. 
 159  Id. (The plaintiff in this case suffered from chronic pain in the form of strain 
and muscle spasms in his back. The plaintiff sustained these injuries while serving in 
the armed forces.). 
 160  Id.  
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Therefore, under California law, it is permissible for an employer to 
take failed pre-employment drug tests into consideration when 
making employment decisions.161  As was the case in Ross, an 
employer may fire an employee that tests positive for THC in a 
required drug test, even if the employee furnishes a copy of a 
physician’s recommendation that the employee use medical 
marijuana.162 
The court noted that if California’s medical marijuana act had 
given medical marijuana the same status as a legal prescription drug, 
then the result of the case might have been different.163  The court, 
however, emphasized that the Act’s reach was not that broad.164  
Specifically, the Act exempted medical marijuana users from criminal 
liability under state statutes and was not intended to address “the 
respective rights and obligations of employers and employees.”165  
Like the NJCUMMA, California’s medical marijuana statute fails to 
address problems that arise in the employment context—namely, 
whether it offers any protection to employees who use marijuana for 
medicinal purposes.166  Furthermore, employer refusal to 
accommodate does not affect the goal of the Act, which is to provide 
immunity from state criminal liability—which, again, is the primary 
purpose of the NJCUMMA as well.167 
California’s medical-marijuana act contains similar language to 
the NJCUMMA on the issue of employer accommodation.168  The 
plaintiff’s argument in Ross, though ultimately unsuccessful, was that 
this language should be read “as if it articulated express exceptions to 
a general requirement of accommodation that appears only 
implicitly.”169  The court stated that this interpretation might have 
merit “if the failure to infer a requirement of accommodation would 
 
 161  Id. 
 162  See Ross, 174 P.3d at 203. 
 163  Id. at 204. 
 164  See id. 
 165  Id. 
 166  Id. at 205.  
 167  Id. at 206.  
 168  Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-14 (West 2011) (stating that “[n]othing in this 
act shall be construed to require . . .  an employer to accommodate the medical use 
of marijuana in any workplace”), with CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE, § 11362.785(d) 
(West 2011) (stating that “nothing in this article shall require any accommodation of 
any medical use of marijuana on the property or premises of any place of 
employment or during the hours of employment”). 
 169  Ross, 174 P.3d at 207. 
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render the statute meaningless.”170  Yet, the court held that this was 
not the case, as the statute “can be given literal effect as negating any 
expectation” that the protection from criminal liability under the Act 
would give medical marijuana users “a civilly enforceable right to 
possess the drug at work or in custody.”171 
The Ross court also rejected the plaintiff’s public policy 
argument.172  Under California law, the public policy exception to the 
general at-will employee regime requires the policy to be: (1) 
supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision; (2) for the 
benefit of the public as a whole rather than only the individual; (3) in 
place at the time the employee is fired; and (4) “fundamental and 
substantial.”173  The court noted that California’s medical marijuana 
act “does not speak to employment law” and in no way established a 
public policy requiring employers to accommodate for employees 
using the drug.174  In dicta, the court also noted that the employer 
had not prevented the plaintiff from having access to medical 
treatment, but merely decided not to employ him.175  These 
requirements differ from the requirements under New Jersey’s public 
policy exception.176 
The decision in Ross helps predict the result of litigation on this 
issue in a New Jersey court.  Like California’s act, the NJCUMMA 
does not specifically address the rights and duties of employers and 
employees.177  Further, like California’s statute, the Act does not give 
medical marijuana the same status as a legal prescription drug—it 
merely provides a protection from state criminal prosecution.178  A 
New Jersey court is likely to agree with the reasoning in Ross because 
of these similarities.  The limited protections the NJCUMMA creates 
also provide support for rejecting any reasonable accommodation 
claims or Pierce public policy claims. 
B. Washington (Roe v. Teletech Customer Care Management, 
LLC) 
In Roe v. Teletech Customer Care Management, the Supreme Court 
 
 170  Id.  
 171  Id. 
 172  Id. at 209. 
 173  Id. at 208.  
 174  Id.  
 175  Ross, 174 P.3d at 209. 
 176  See supra Part III.B.3.  
 177  See supra Part II.A.  
 178  See id.  
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of Washington held that Washington’s medical-marijuana act did not 
provide a private cause of action for a plaintiff-employee discharged 
for the use of medical marijuana.179  The court also held that the Act 
did not create a “clear public policy that would support a claim for 
wrongful discharge in violation of such a policy.”180  Therefore, 
employers in Washington may discharge an employee for medical 
marijuana use. 
Regarding employee accommodation, Washington’s medical 
marijuana act uses language similar to the language in the 
NJCUMMA.181  The Roe court found that the language of the Act was 
unambiguous.182  The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that 
because the statute “explicitly [did] not require an employer to 
accommodate medical marijuana use ‘in any place of employment,’ 
the statute implicitly requires an employer to accommodate an 
employee’s medical marijuana use outside the workplace.”183  The 
court stated that such an implicit obligation did not stem from the 
explicit statement in the statute.184  Instead, the court held that the 
statute’s silence supported the conclusion that the employer was not 
required to accommodate off-site medical marijuana use.185 
Turning to the history of the Act, the court found no support for 
“reading an employment protection into the statute.”186  The court 
examined extrinsic evidence187 and determined that the evidence did 
not support an interpretation that would require an employer to 
accommodate off-site use of marijuana.188 
In rejecting the plaintiff’s public policy argument, the court 
noted that, under Washington law, courts are instructed to “proceed 
cautiously if called upon to declare public policy absent some prior 
 
 179  Roe v. TeleTech Customer Care Mgmt., 257 P.3d 586, 588 (Wash. 2011). 
 180  Id. 
 181  Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-14 (West 2010) (stating that “[n]othing in this 
act shall be construed to require . . . an employer to accommodate the medical use of 
marijuana in any workplace”), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.060 (West 2011) 
(stating that “[n]othing in this chapter requires any accommodation of any on-site 
medical use of cannabis in any place of employment . . . .”). 
 182  Roe, 257 P.3d at 590. 
 183  Id. at 591 (emphasis in original). 
 184  Id. at 592.  
 185  Id. at 593. 
 186  Id. at 592. 
 187  The examined evidence included the Drafter’s Declaration, the 2007 
Amendments to the Act, and the voter pamphlet that went out when the Act was 
passed. 
 188  Roe, 257 P.3d at 592. 
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legislative or judicial expression on the subject.”189  Washington courts 
construe this exception narrowly in an effort to avoid “swallow[ing] 
the general rule of at-will employment.”190  These requirements 
appear to be stricter than the requirements of the public policy 
exception under New Jersey law.191 
New Jersey and Washington have similar language in their 
medical-marijuana statutes regarding employers’ accommodation of 
employee use of marijuana in the workplace.192  As such, a court in 
New Jersey is likely to find, as the court did in Roe, that this limited 
language is insufficient to establish an implicit requirement that an 
employer accommodate an employee’s use of the drug outside the 
workplace.  Washington has amended its medical marijuana statute to 
reflect the decision in Roe.193  The statute now includes the language 
“[e]mployers may establish drug-free work policies.  Nothing in this 
chapter requires an accommodation for the medical use of cannabis 
if an employer has a drug-free work place.”194  This is exactly the type 
of language that the Legislature should add into the NJCUMMA.  By 
adding this language to the Act before medical marijuana is 
distributed in New Jersey, the State can avoid fruitless litigation like 
Roe in Washington. 
C. Oregon (Emerald Steel Fabricators v. Bureau of Labor & 
Industries) 
The plaintiff in Emerald Steel Fabricators v. Bureau of Labor & 
 
 189  Id. at 595 (quoting Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 
(Wash. 1984)). 
 190  Id. (citing Sedlacek v. Hillis, 36 P.3d 1014, 1019 (Wash. 2001)). 
 191  Compare discussion supra Part III.B.3, with Roe, 257 P.3d at 595.  Under 
Washington law, the public-policy exemption to the at-will employment doctrine 
contains four requirements:  
(1) The plaintiffs must prove the existence of a clear public policy . . . 
[;] (2) The plaintiffs must prove that discouraging the conduct in 
which they engaged would jeopardize the public policy . . . [;] (3) The 
plaintiffs must prove that the public-policy-linked conduct caused the 
dismissal . . . [; and] (4) The defendant must not be able to offer an 
overriding justification for the dismissal . . . . 
Roe, 257 P.3d at 595. 
 192  Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:6I-14 (West 2010) (stating that “[n]othing in this 
act shall be construed to require . . . an employer to accommodate the medical use of 
marijuana in any workplace”), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.060 (West 2011) 
(stating that “[n]othing in this chapter requires any accommodation of any on-site 
medical use of cannabis in any place of employment . . . .”). 
 193  See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.060 (West 2011). 
 194  Id. 
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Industries was a former part-time employee who had been anticipating 
an offer of permanent employment.195  The plaintiff knew that he 
would have to pass a drug test as a condition of permanent 
employment, so he revealed to his supervisor that he was a medical 
marijuana patient.196  One week later, the supervisor discharged the 
plaintiff.197  The court ultimately concluded that federal preemption 
supported the conclusion that an employer was not required to 
accommodate an employee’s off-site use of medical marijuana.198 
Oregon’s employee-protection statute does not apply to 
employees who are “currently engaged in the illegal use of drugs, if 
the employer takes an adverse action based on that use.”199  The court 
reasoned that if medical marijuana use is an illegal use of drugs 
within the meaning of Oregon’s employee-protection statute, then an 
employer would be excused from engaging “in a meaningful 
interactive process or otherwise accommodat[ing] employee’s use of 
medical-marijuana.”200  The court concluded that the Federal 
Controlled Substances Act, which explicitly prohibits marijuana use 
without regard to medicinal purpose, preempted the provision of the 
Oregon Medical Marijuana Act that affirmatively authorizes the use 
of medical marijuana.201 
A New Jersey court is unlikely to conclude that federal 
preemption is the deciding factor in a case similar to Emerald Steel.  
Under New Jersey law, there is no explicit carve-out for illegal drug 
use regarding an employer making a reasonable accommodation.202  
New Jersey courts have held that employee accommodation may still 
be required in cases involving addiction or dependency on legal or 
illegal drugs.203  A New Jersey court is unlikely to adopt the same 
“federal preemption” reasoning employed by the court in Emerald 
Steel, but a New Jersey court is likely to arrive at the same conclusion—
that an employer is not required to accommodate an employee’s off-
site use of medical marijuana.  The text, history, and purpose of the 
 
 195  Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230 P.3d 518, 520 
(Or. 2010). 
 196  Id. at 521.  
 197  Id. 
 198  Id. at 520 (“Under Oregon’s employment discrimination laws, employer was 
not required to accommodate employee’s use of medical marijuana.”).  
 199  Id. at 524. 
 200  Id. (citations omitted).  
 201  Emerald Steel, 230 P.3d at 536. 
 202  See supra Part III.B. 
 203  See supra Part III.B.  
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NJCUMMA are sufficient grounds to find that an employer is not 
required to accommodate an employee’s off-site use of marijuana if 
the employer wishes to maintain a drug-free workplace.  The option 
to maintain a drug-free workplace notwithstanding the adoption of 
the NJCUMMA should be preserved through an amendment to the 
Act preserving this right. 
D. Michigan (Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.) 
The plaintiff in Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a case from the 
Western District of Michigan, was an at-will employee who was fired 
after testing positive for marijuana in a mandatory drug test following 
a workplace injury.204  Unlike the court in Emerald Steel, the court in 
Casias never reached the issue of federal preemption.205  The court 
instead rested its holding on the fact that none of the protections the 
plaintiff sought were found in the text of Michigan’s medical 
marijuana statute.206 
The plaintiff advanced two theories in support of his wrongful 
discharge claim.207  The first claim was that the Michigan Medical 
Marijuana Act (MMMA) created an implied right of action.208  The 
second claim was a cause of action based on a violation of the public 
policy created by the Act.209  The court noted that the test for an 
implied private right of action under Michigan case law is stringent.210  
The court also discussed the apparent overlap of these two theories, 
stating that “if the alleged public policy at issue is created by statute, 
and if the statute does not itself create a private cause of action to 
enforce the policy, where does a court receive the power to create a 
remedy . . . ?”211  The court concluded that both claims failed because 
under either of plaintiff’s theories he would have to show that “the 
statutory policy at issue applies to this case.”212  The court concluded 
that the plaintiff could not meet this requirement because Michigan’s 
medical marijuana act only addresses adverse actions by the state, and 
 
 204  Casias v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 914, 915 (W.D. Mich. 2011). 
 205  Id. at 920. 
 206  Id.  
 207  Id. at 921. 
 208  Id.  
 209  Id. 
 210  Casias, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 920 (citing Lash v. City of Traverse City, 735 N.W.2d 
628, 636–37 (Mich. 2007) (a private right of action cannot be inferred without 
evidence of legislative intent)).  
 211  Id. at 921.  
 212  Id. 
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does not regulate private employment.213 
The court examined the plain language of the MMMA and 
found that it nowhere “state[d] that the statute regulates private 
employment, that private employees are protected from disciplinary 
action should they use medical marijuana, or that private employers 
must accommodate the use of medical marijuana outside of the 
workplace.”214  The court also addressed language in the MMMA that 
is similar to the language in the NJCUMMA.215  The MMMA states 
that nothing in the act requires “[a]n employer to accommodate the 
ingestion of marihuana in any workplace or any employee working 
while under the influence of marihuana.”216  The language of the act 
did not directly address employees who do not use marijuana in the 
workplace or come to work under the influence but still test positive 
for the drug. 217  Nevertheless, the court refused to hold that this “sole 
mention of employment” operated as a “negative inference, 
prohibiting private employers from disciplining an employee who 
uses medical marijuana away from the workplace.”218  The court stated 
that it could not “draw a negative inference about employment 
protections when the remainder of the statute is silent on the rights 
of employees.”219  While the act provided protection from criminal 
prosecution on state law, it did not provide employment protections 
to medical marijuana users.220 
The Casias court also refused to create a new protected class 
under Michigan law.  The court stated that the argument the plaintiff 
advanced would allow medical-marijuana users to “enjoy the kind of 
employment safeguards offered to only a very few groups under 
Michigan law.”221  The court refused to do this because it “would 
create a new protected employee class in Michigan and mark a 
radical departure from the general rule of at-will employment in 
Michigan.”222  Given New Jersey’s expansive protections for many 
classes of employees,223 the argument exists that a court in New Jersey 
 
 213  Id. 
 214  Id. at 922. 
 215  Id. at 924. 
 216  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.26427(c)(2) (West 2011). 
 217  Casias, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 924.  
 218  Id. 
 219  Id. 
 220  Id. at 925. 
 221  Id.  
 222  Id. at 922. 
 223  See discussion supra in Part III.B (possible protection against discrimination 
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should consider creating a new protected class for qualified patients 
with diseases and disabilities that are resistant to traditional 
treatments and necessitate the use of medical marijuana.  The limited 
language of the NJCUMMA is similar enough to the language in the 
MMMA that a court in New Jersey could adopt the reasoning in 
Casias that the statute is limited to providing protection from state 
criminal prosecution and does not create new employment 
protections for medical marijuana users. 
V. SUGGESTIONS 
To avoid fruitless litigation, the issues regarding medical 
marijuana in the employment law context must be clarified. This 
clarification can be achieved by amending the text of the Act to 
clearly state that employers are still permitted to establish drug-free 
work policies. Additional language should be added reinforce the 
principle that nothing in the NJCUMMA requires accommodation 
for medical-marijuana patients if the employer wishes to maintain its 
drug-free workplace.  This will allow for the grant of a motion to 
dismiss on these claims and prevent a drain on the resources of both 
the courts and defendant-employers. 
The Legislature should amend the NJCUMMA to include 
language that allows employers to maintain drug-screening policies 
that may inadvertently lead to the termination of medical-marijuana 
patients.  It would be too extreme to allow discrimination against 
employees based solely on their status as a medical-marijuana patient, 
and some protection could be provided against refusing to hire 
someone based solely on this status.224  This limited form of 
protection need not address limiting adverse action against 
employees or potential employees with marijuana metabolites in their 
system as revealed in a drug screening.  If an employer wishes to 
maintain a drug-free work environment, and requires this for all 
employees—medical marijuana patients and non-patients alike—the 
employer should be allowed to do so.  States that have included 
overly protective language for employees have since retreated.225  New 
 
for employees with, e.g., varicose veins, drug addiction).  
 224  See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 21-28.6-4 (West 2011) (“No . . . employer . . . 
may refuse to . . . employ . . . or otherwise penalize a person solely for his or her 
status as a cardholder.”). 
 225  See Hickox, supra note 7, at 1008–09 (noting that Maine’s medical marijuana 
statute originally forbade subjecting an employee to “any disciplinary action by a 
business or occupation based on his or her lawful use of medical marijuana,” but this 
section was repealed effective January 1, 2011). 
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Jersey would be wise to follow the lead of Washington226 and amend 
the NJCUMMA to protect employers’ freedom to maintain a drug-
free workplace. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The existing canon of New Jersey employment law gives 
discharged medical marijuana patients ample arguments to present 
to the court.  Due to the limited scope, language, and intent of the 




 226  See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.51A.060 (West 2011) (“Employers may 
establish drug-free work policies.  Nothing in this chapter requires an 
accommodation for the medical use of cannabis if an employer has a drug-free work 
place.”).  
